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ARTICLE
JOINT AUTHORITY? THE CASE FOR STATE-BASED
MARIJUANA REGULATION
Matthew ShechtmanI
Over the past several decades the United States
government has cast an intimidating shadow over the states
in the drug policy arena. Congress inaugurated the "War
on Drugs" in 1970 through the Controlled Substances Act,
banning the possession, consumption, and distribution of a
host of narcotic substances, including marijuana. The past
decade, however, brought a revolution in the form of state-
based marijuana regulation. Ranging from
decriminalization to medical licensing, more than a dozen
states have enacted laws contradicting the blunt legalist
strictures of the CSA.
Relying on the tenets of public choice theory and
jurisdictional competition for law, this article addresses a
range of regulatory frameworks for marijuana regulation,
concluding that decentralization in favor of the states
provides the most efficient and pragmatic mechanism for
marijuana policy. Though relatively uncommented on, the
incoherent federal-state stance on drug policy leaves
citizens and enforcement agencies in a troubling
predicament regarding the legality of marijuana use and
possession. After covering traditional externalities and
"Race to the Bottom" scholarship, this article hypothesizes
a possible "Race to Nowhere" conundrum wherein states
contemplating drug policy may be faced with an all-or-
nothing dilemma, forced to choose between a complete ban
and outright legalization. While analogy to Prohibition and
alcohol regulation gives some insight that this race exists,
1 Matthew Shechtman is currently serving as a judicial law clerk for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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federal oversight is a poor regulatory mechanism when
accounting for a variety of balanced incentives and
extensive interest group influence.
Ultimately, America's "War on Drugs" has left its
populace confused and disenfranchised, unable to employ
their preferences to foster innovative and effective social
policies. Decentralized regulation, on the other hand,
provides states the ability to liberalize marijuana policy or
maintain the status quo, leaving the choice over tax
revenues, drug crime, prison overpopulation, and interest
group lobbying to state lawmakers and their constituents.
The United States' ongoing "War on Drugs" has
reached a new level of confusion as several states have
deviated from the unremitting federal policy against
2marijuana use and sale. Contributing to the confusion are
the co-extensive, yet sometimes conflicting Constitutional
tenets of interstate commerce, 3 Tenth Amendment state
sovereignty,4 and historic principles of federalism in state
criminal enforcement.5 While there is no apparent end in
sight for this overarching battle of federal versus state
control, this article focuses on the highly controversial
issue of what level of government should take
responsibility for the formation of marijuana policy.
Though much attention has been paid to the
constitutionality and wisdom of drug enforcement,
2 See infra Part III.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
5 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("This federalist
structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous
advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows
for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a
mobile citizenry.") (citations omitted).
45
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relatively little "has been paid to [the] level-of-government
issues [present] in current drug policy discussions."6
This article begins with a brief overview of the
current regulatory background in the drug enforcement
landscape, followed by a description of the regulatory
dynamic at work from a jurisdictional competition
perspective. Part II of this article discusses the currently
established federal regulatory framework and ultimately
argues that federal authority should be disbanded and
decentralized in favor of state policymaking and
enforcement authority. Part II thus suggests a state-based
regulatory framework, arguing that competition between
jurisdictions will benefit the market for marijuana policy
and should result in state authority akin to alcohol
regulation following the enactment of the Twenty-First
Amendment. Part III presents a critique of the state
consolidation posited by Michael O'Hear and his
"Competitive Alternative" regulatory framework found in
Federalism and Drug Control.7 Part III also rebuts
O'Hear's criticisms, arguing that the market for marijuana
law is not conducive to the market failures he posits.
Finally, Part IV sets forth a previously undeveloped theory
of state-based market failure, discussing a hypothetical
"Race to Nowhere," in which jurisdictions may be faced
with an all-or-nothing choice between legalization and a
complete ban on marijuana. Though ultimately concluding
that the assumptions necessary to engender the "Race to
Nowhere" are unlikely to be found in a market for
marijuana policy, Part IV concludes by noting the
possibility for such a polarizing problem and the need for
informed regulatory decision making.
6 FRANKUN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR
RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 159 (1992).




8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 47
I. The Federal Government's "War on Drugs"
and State Divergence in Marijuana Policymaking
The origin of today's "War on Drugs" emanated
from Richard Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign, where
he cited growing drug use as the next great problem facing
the nation.8 Just a few years later, the Nixon Administration
created the federal Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") and increased the drug enforcement budget to
nearly $800 million.9 Though Nixon was primarily
concerned with the more potent and destructive heroin
epidemic,10 marijuana use was easily subsumed into the
United States' drug war following three decades of
haphazardly implemented anti-marijuana criminal and tax
laws."
The "War on Drugs" fire was stoked once again by
a republican presidential campaign in 1980.12 Backed by
the powerful "parents' movement,"l 3 Ronald Reagan re-
established the "War on Drugs" through the "Just Say No"
campaign and increased the federal drug-enforcement
budget to nearly $6 billion within the next three years.14
The anti-drug establishment continued to escalate through
the 1990s, enlisting almost $20 billion in federal anti-drug
8 See TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC
CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND ORDER 110 (2001).
9 See SAM STALEY, DRUG POLICY AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
CITIES 188 (1992).
1o CAROLINE JEAN ACKER, CREATING THE AMERICAN JUNKIE:
ADDICTION RESEARCH IN THE CLASSIC ERA OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
217-18 (2002).
11 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 796-97.
12 GEST, supra note 8, at 113.
13 ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP
LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 23-24 (2003).
14 GEST, supra note 8, at 115. Without turning the "War on Drugs" into
a partisan political manifesto, it is interesting to note that President
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coffers by 1998.15 The 21st century has seen little retreat
from the legalist regime of the past three decades as the
political ante continues to intensify. A modern example is
exemplified by the Bush Administration's National Drug
Control Strategy, aimed at "healing America's drug
users."l6
Most relevant to today's marijuana legalization
debate is the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), which
incorporates marijuana among its many listed illicit
substances.' 7 Maximum penalties for marijuana possession,
cultivation, and distribution range from one year to life in
prison, with maximum fines from one thousand to eight
million dollars depending on the amount of marijuana at
issue and the circumstances underlying the conviction.' 8
The CSA is undoubtedly one of the most salient
consequences of current Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding Congress' interstate commerce power. Notably,
the Court found in Gonzales v. Raich that Congress did not
overstep its Constitutional authority by regulating the trade
of illicit substances, including marijuana. 19 Relying on
Wickard v. Fillburn,20 the Court held that even purely
intrastate cultivation and distribution of marijuana is
subject to federal regulation under the interstate commerce
15 GEST, supra note 8, at 115.
16 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (2003);
see also O'Hear, supra note 7, at 802.
7 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2006).
8 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 844(a) (2006); see Vijay Sekhon,
Comment, Highly Uncertain Times: An Analysis of the Executive
Branch's Decision to not Investigate or Prosecute Individuals in
Compliance with State Medical Marijuana Laws, 37 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 553, 553-54 (2010).
19 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
20 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (establishing that
Congress has the power to regulate purely local activities that make up
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clause-and hence constitutionally controlled under the
CSA.21
Even before Supreme Court jurisprudence
dramatically extended Congress' ability to regulate illicit
substances in interstate commerce, several commentators
decried a federal "monopoly" over drug policy.22 Though
the federal government has always possessed "an
impressive array of tools to influence policymaking at
lower levels of government," 23 recent developments in
academia and state-based drug policies, suggest that state
authority and policy innovation has established a solid
footing in the marijuana law paradigm, ranging from
medical-use licensing to decriminalization. While
recognizing the federal government's oversight role in drug
enforcement policy, this article ultimately argues for
horizontal competition-at the expense of federal
supremacy 25-in marijuana policy for several reasons.
21 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 18, 33.
22 See DANIEL K. BENJAMIN & ROGER LEROY MILLER, UNDOING
DRUGS: BEYOND LEGALIZATION 97, 217, 219 (1991); Sandra Guerra,
The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1192 (1995)
("In the fight against drugs ... the federal government is effectively the
only government.").
23 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 806.
24 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 806-20 (noting that the federal
government maintains considerable media control and sway over the
citizenry, formidable direct enforcement capabilities, conditional
monetary spending, control over forfeiture and equitable sharing laws,
and multi-jurisdictional task forces).
25 Even if the federal government can utilize its preemptive power to
force states to institute marijuana enforcement laws, there is good
reason to argue that it should not. As discussed infra, unlike other
crimes with no clear societal benefit, marijuana legalization arguably
provides significant societal benefits. In contrast to the "Race to the
Bottom" proposed by Teichman in the market for penal laws aimed at
sex crimes, marijuana laws provide a wide array of consequences, both
positive and negative, to lead to an arguably efficient market for
marijuana laws. Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice:
49
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First, it is not clear that the federal government has
constitutional authority to mandate state drug policy.26
Though preemption, through properly enacted federal law,
plays an important role in drug enforcement, the federal
government cannot require a state to enforce federal laws.27
Second, though the mere presence of federal enforcement
undoubtedly affects state policymaking, the lack of federal
enforcement resources strongly limits the feasibility of
effective wide-scale federal enforcement. To be sure, drug
laws are almost exclusively implemented and policed by
Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 1831, 1867 (2005). Given the small likelihood of a "Race to
the Bottom" effect, federal preemption and the necessity for
centralization to pursue optimality is reduced, if not eliminated. Cf
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-
Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 217 (1997). Though the supplemental
argument to the preemption point is aimed at legal uniformity and
avoiding the added informational costs, this consequence of
disuniformity may be limited given the publicity of marijuana laws and
extensive consumer knowledge in a unique area of consumer lifestyle
choice. Cf id. at 273.
26 Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana
and the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62
VAND. L. REV 1421, 1422 (2009) ("Contrary to conventional wisdom,
state laws legalizing conduct banned by Congress remain in force and,
in many instances, may even constitute the de facto governing law of
the land."). In an interesting preemption caveat, carved by the Tenth
Amendment, a congressional attempt to preempt state "inaction"-state
failure to enact laws banning the use of marijuana-would be an
effective command for the states to take an action to proscribe medical
marijuana, in violation of the Supreme Court's anti-commandeering
rule established in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992). Id. at 1424. This article does note, however, the likely
counterargument that state enactment of medical marijuana laws may
conflict with the CSA, thereby invoking established conflict
preemption principles. But for the purposes of this limited foray into
jurisdictional competition, this article presumes that Congress cannot
force the states to enact drug laws, nor preempt states' medical
marijuana regulatory mechanisms.
27 New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
50
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28state and local governments. As such, the likelihood of
vertical competition from the federal government is
reduced.29 Lastly, federal regulation is inefficient and
burdensome, diminishing citizen autonomy, while
hindering innovation and consumer choice. 30
Regardless of the federal government's involvement
in drug policy, current state innovation in marijuana
legislation is undoubtedly significant. Presently, sixteen
28 The Obama administration has indicated through Executive Order
that it no longer wishes to prosecute users or dispensaries unless they
violate both federal and state law, effectively leaving the legalization
choice up to states, while their citizens can feel comfortable they will
not be prosecuted by the federal government. Josh Meyer & Scott
Glover, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Will no Longer be
Prosecuted, U.S. Attorney General Says, L.A. TIMES, (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/19local/me-medpotl9; see also
Devlin Barrett, Attorney General Signals Marijuana Policy Shift,
MSNBC.COM, (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/29760656/ns/politics-white house/t/attorney-general-signals-
marijuana-policy-shift/#.TrC5g3EYfYY; Memorandum from David W.
Odgen, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Selected United States Attorneys (Oct.
19, 2009), http:// www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-
marijuana.pdf. Though the federal government governs enormous
resources, it only manages one percent of the nearly 800,000 marijuana
cases generated each year. Mikos, supra note 26, at 1424. As such,
most regular users under a state-enabled medical marijuana regime are
very unlikely to be prosecuted by the federal government. Id.
29 Harvard Professor, Mark Roe, has recognized that vertical
competition in the corporate legal model may disrupt the traditional
theory of corporate law rules in a jurisdictional competitive framework.
Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 635
(2003). In this vertical competition model, Delaware's real competition
for corporate legal rules comes not from sister states, but from the
federal government where "Delaware corporate law can be displaced
by, and is often influenced by, federal authorities, thereby rendering
any pure race .. . impossible, however attractive it might be in theory."
Id. Realistically, Roe's vertical competition argument is fundamentally
viable outside of the corporate framework. Given the two
aforementioned federal regulatory limitations, however, it seems less
likely to apply to the marijuana debate.
30 See infra Part III.
51
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states as well as the District of Columbia have enacted
legislation legalizing the possession, cultivation, and use of
marijuana for the treatment of certain illnesses.3 1 Against
this state regulatory backdrop loom the CSA and the
potential for DEA and FBI enforcement. As previously
mentioned, however, the federal government plays a very
small role in the enforcement and prosecution of marijuana
users, growers, and dispensaries-the United States
Attorney only manages about one percent of all marijuana
cases, leaving the rest to state enforcement. 32 Given that
federal resources are unable to manage the overwhelming
drug caseload, and that many states have already shown
their unwillingness to cede power over drug regulation and
enforcement, there is significant room for states to
implement and experiment with new marijuana laws. With
state experimentation comes the possibility for competition
between states in the enactment of innovative marijuana
regulatory schemes and legalization policies. This dynamic
is known as jurisdictional competition, or more simply, the
market for laws.33 The basic premise of the jurisdictional
competition paradigm is that governments compete to
supply laws in order to support the influx of business and
economic benefits, taxes, and citizenry. 34 This legal market
31 These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Vermont, in
addition to the District of Columbia. Nat'l Org. for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws, Medical Marijuana, NORML.ORG, (last visited Nov.
1, 2011), http://norml.org/legal/medical-marijuana-2. Maryland has
decriminalized the possession of less than one ounce of marijuana by
individuals who can demonstrate, as an affirmative defense, that their
use of marijuana is out of medical necessity. Nat'l Org. for the Reform
of Marijuana Laws, Maryland Medical Marijuana, NORML.ORG, (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011), http://norml.org/legallitem/maryland-medical-
marijuana?category-id=835; see also Sekhon, supra note 18, at 553.
32 See Mikos, supra note 26.
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concept has been applied most extensively in the corporate
law context, focusing on Delaware's market dominance.
The market concept has, however, found a receptive
audience in the fields of environmental law, tax,
bankruptcy, trusts, and family law.35
This article embarks on an analysis of the
competitive framework over drug lawmaking authority and
enforcement. While recognizing the historic dominance of
federal authority in the field,36 it argues against the efficacy
of federal authority and in favor of decentralized regulation
over marijuana policy. Using alcohol regulation as a
guiding example, this article argues for state authority over
marijuana regulation, with localized enforcement and state
discretion over local policymaking authority.
Notwithstanding the ban on possession, cultivation,
distribution, and use, there are a number of regulatory
mechanisms states can implement outside of absolute
illegality. For instance, states can institute penalty schemes,
by varying sentencing guidelines or establishing statutory
penalty frameworks that differentiate between
35 Id. (citing, inter alia, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435 (1992); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1210 (1992); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax,
82 VA. L. REV. 413 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The
Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York:
Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND L. REV. 231
(2001); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to
the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000); Jennifer G. Brown,
Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995)).
36 See Roe, supra note 29, and accompanying text (while the CSA is
technically the supreme law of the land regarding drug possession, use,
and distribution, it is rarely enforced, though recognizably could be
with the proper resources).
53
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misdemeanor and felony violations. 37 In addition, some
states have employed alternative sentencing schemes,
experimenting with drug treatment courts and probation
dependent upon the successful completion of a
rehabilitation program. Outside of varying penalties,
states have an array of legalization options, ranging from
39 40full legalization to marijuana licenses for medical use.
Not to mention, several states have instituted
decriminalization laws wherein possession and use is either
legal or considered a misdemeanor, while distribution and
41trafficking remains criminal.
Enhanced forfeiture is also an interesting option for
reform that has potential incentive effects not only for
37 For example, the famous 1973 Rockefeller drug laws included very
strict mandatory minimum sentences. GEST, supra note 8, at 199. Even
as early as the 1970s, however, many states decriminalized marijuana
possession to some extent, providing minimal fines for first offenders.
Albert DiChiara & John F. Galliher, Dissonance and Contradictions in
the Origins of Marihuana Decriminalizations, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
41, 48 (1994). This trend has continued today in California, which
makes marijuana possession a misdemeanor. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11357 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation). Possession of less
than one ounce is punishable by a maximum $100 fine. Id.
38 Both Miami's Dade County and the city of Denver implemented
specific drug courts for the purpose of expediting drug case
management and instituting alternative treatment paradigms in an effort
to reduce the caseload and burgeoning prison populations. O'Hear,
supra note 7, at 823-28. These programs met with mixed success and
general federal hostility. Id.
39 No state has completely decriminalized marijuana, though there have
been initiatives in Alaska, Nevada, Arizona, and South Dakota.
O'Hear, supra note 7, at 836-37.
4 The most visible medical marijuana law is undoubtedly California's
Proposition 215, which legalizes the possession or cultivation of
marijuana for any patient or primary caregiver who has "the written or
oral recommendation or approval of a physician." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation).
41 Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Marijuana
Decriminalization and Its Impact on Use, NORML.ORG, (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011), http://norml.org/index.cfm?GroupID=3383.
54
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42criminal possessors but for state coffers. As most state
laws currently stand, asset forfeiture "provides a significant
incentive for state and local governments both to allocate
substantial resources to drug enforcement and to cooperate
with federal agencies."43 On the other hand, from a
marijuana user's perspective, reform initiatives aimed at
limiting state and federal ability to confiscate property in
conjunction with drug seizures may be a considerable
incentive to relocate.4
Given the myriad of potential decentralized
alternatives for marijuana regulation, there is significant
room for jurisdictional competition among state and
municipal governments for citizens, businesses, tax
revenues, and reduced violent crime. On the other hand, the
drug debate is never quite so clear-cut; there are significant
political45  and moral considerations-e.g. addiction,
rehabilitation, and health care expenditures, as well as the
potential for decreased economic productivity in the wake
42 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 834-35.
43 Id. at 834.
4 Oregon and Utah have both proposed laws aimed at limiting asset
forfeiture laws in an effort to reduce the potential for abuses and
conflicts of interest "that arise when police get to keep the proceeds of
their own drug busts." O'Hear, supra note 7, at 835. "Imagine if IRS
auditors were paid a commission for every deduction they threw out."
Libertarian Party of Or., Argument in Favor of Oregon's Measure 3,
STATE.OR.US, (last visited Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.sos.state.or.us/
elections/pages/history/archive/nov72000/guide/mealm3/3fa.htm.
45 Though outside the scope of this article, the underground drug trade
is a hotly debated political issue, both domestically and abroad. United
States' demand for drugs has drastic effects on both Central and South
American countries, including El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico,
Panama, and Columbia. The Drug War Hits Central America, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2011, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/18560287 (noting that despite efforts to stem the tide of
violence in countries south of the border, United States drug policy has
an enormous effect on the underground influence of organized drug
crime, making many Central American provinces "deadlier . . . than
most conventional war zones").
55
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of potentially rampant drug abuse. Given the complex
considerations involved, the next Part will introduce a new
theory of decentralized marijuana regulation modeled
partly after state alcohol regulation, while accounting for
possible spillover effects, interest group influence, and
political incentives unique to the market for marijuana.
II. Invigorating the Market for Marijuana Laws
- Embracing a Decentralized Role for Regulation
With fundamentally different individual and
political viewpoints in the marijuana debate, citizen
autonomy should be at the forefront of the regulatory
policymaking agenda, providing an avenue for increased
individual choice and more efficient and innovative
lawmaking. Accordingly, the core argument in this article
promotes the redistribution of marijuana regulatory
authority away from the federal government and into the
hands of the states and local authorities.
After first outlining the current regulatory
framework, this Part argues for the rejection of federal
control over marijuana policymaking. Noting the federal
government's failure to account for state innovation and
autonomy, the first section utilizes public choice theory to
establish a state-based framework akin to alcohol
regulation following the Twenty-First Amendment. The
following section explains criticisms of such a position, but
ultimately dispels these analyses in favor of the state as
central decision-maker. The following section, however,
points out, and expands upon, two well-founded critiques
of consolidated state control so as to build on the
decentralization framework; placing state and local politics
at the forefront of the marijuana regulatory regime.
56
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A. Federal Involvement in Drug Policy
Ironically, current drug policy can best be described
by the "Cooperative Federalism" framework. This
regulatory depiction is "a combination of federal policy
mandates and inducements (such as conditional grants) that
require or provide strong financial incentives for states to
implement the federal policy."4 6 National policy issues that
are not only resource intensive, but also respond to
hypothetical state-to-state externalities further buoy the
federally dominated regulatory regime.47 Sparked by states
enacting reactive policies to a particular problem, the
federal government responds at the behest of states and
- 48interest groups most invested in the issue.
On one hand, states concerned about the capacity to
fund these programs and the ability to successfully
implement the program if other states do not conform push
the federal government to enact a national program. On
the other hand, federal politicians can garner the political
support of vocal interest groups,50 while only paying for
part of the overarching program. ' In the context of drug
policy, "Cooperative Federalism" is illustrated by the
pioneer states that first prohibited marijuana, and the
resulting federal program, implemented through the CSA
and the "War on Drugs." As the "Cooperative Federalism"
framework predicts, the drug regulation dynamic balances
46 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 843-44.
47 Id. at 844-45.
48 See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MIss.
L.J. 557, 558 (2000).
49 Id.
5 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 6, at 167. This framework is
undoubtedly played out in the drug policy arena, where federal
enforcement accounts for roughly one percent of marijuana
prosecution, and the "War on Drugs" has been a steadfast political
soapbox.
5 Id. (estimating that the federal government pays somewhere between
thirty-five and fifty percent of the total cost of the "War on Drugs").
57
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"federal desires for control (and hence political support)
and . . . engagement of state and local law enforcement in
the war on drugs (and hence minimization of costs to the
federal budget)."52
Extensive federal involvement, however, does not
leave adequate room for state innovation in the drug policy
arena. 5 3 Rather, this paradigm is only responsive to the
dynamic wherein states and the federal government express
views that are in agreement, or at the very least, that can be
squared through political compromise.54 As a result, states
are left to either venture on their own, in defiance of federal
policy initiatives, or maintain some complicity with the
"War on Drugs."
B. Federal Drug Regulation is Hampering the
Market for Marijuana Policy
Amidst the federal drug policy debate, there are
abundant theories for optimal policymaking and response
to population preferences. These theories are based on
principles of federalism, public choice, and efficient
competition, and range from strong federal control to
variations of hybrid state-federal policymaking that either
attempt to explain the current dynamic or argue for a shift
in regulatory policy to better engender efficient drug
policy.
This article advocates for decentralized drug
policymaking in an effort to promote democracy,
autonomy, and efficiency. The federal government has
instituted a "War on Drugs," stemming from political and
moral opposition that predominantly began in the 1970s.
Out of political necessity and increasing violence attributed
to drug trafficking, the federal executive branch invested
58
52 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 848.
5 3 See id. at 853.
54 See id.
15
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ever-increasin resources into drug regulation and
enforcement. Rather than promoting uniformity, curing
hypothetical negative externalities, or stemming drug-use,
the federal drug regime led to divergent state drug
policies56 and an Executive Order that retreats from the
strictures of the CSA.57 This drug regime also confuses the
citizenry and retail merchants as to how the federal
government will react to marijuana use, possession, and
distribution.
In contrast to federal marijuana laws, alcohol polic
covering use and distribution is largely left to the states.
60Given the similarities between these two substances, it is
relevant, if not absolutely necessary, to compare the
maladies documented from alcohol prohibition in the 1920s
in an effort to engender a new era of efficient and
autonomous marijuana policymaking in the hands of state
and local governments.
1. The Pitfalls of Prohibition
The federal government has three basic positions it
can take in response to a given state policy: active support,
ss See GEST, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
56 See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
5 See Memorandum from David W. Odgen, supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., Marijuana USA (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 8, 2010);
Marijuana Bill in Congress: Barney Frank, Ron Paul Legislation
Would End Federal Ban on Pot, HUFFINGTON POST, (June 22,
2011 http://www.huffingtonpost.con/2011/06/22/marijuana-bill-
barney-frank-ron-paul-n_882707.html (noting several prominent
federal drug raids despite an Executive Order purportedly ending
enforcement of the CSA).
5 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 187.
6 Id. at 15 ("The enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1920
began the era known as Prohibition, whose parallels to the present are
simply too compelling to ignore.").
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neutrality, or active discouragement. In the drug
regulation arena, the federal government's traditional
stance has been based almost entirely on how closely state
policy resembles the "War on Drugs" paradigm. 6 2 In
contrast, the federal government's role in the alcohol arena
strongly supports state efforts at policymaking, 63 where the
only inde endent roles for the federal government lie in
labeling, taxation, and interstate distribution. 6 6
Current United States alcohol policy is hardly
surprising given Prohibition's sordid past. On January 16,
1920, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution went
into effect and prohibited "the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors . . . for beverage
purposes. . . ."67 Within a few short years, alcohol use once
again became rampant, but was now unregulated,
dangerous, and controlled by organized crime; prisons were
overpopulated, and corruption in public officials was
68
unprecedented.68 Prohibition's failure is distinctly ironic,
61 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 853.
62 Id.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; see BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note
22, at 187 ("[Plrohibition was not repealed in 1933; only federal
prohibition was repealed. The states and their local jurisdictions were
free to exercise whatever degree of regulation, control, or prohibition of
alcohol they felt appropriate. Indeed, the Twenty-first Amendment
went one step further to reaffirm and strengthen the states' power to
control alcoholic beverages: Section 2 of the amendment expressly
prohibits the transportation or importation of alcohol into any state
whenever and wherever such actions violate state and local laws.").
6 See The Federal Alcohol Administration Act ("FAAA"), 27 U.S.C. §
205 (2006).
65 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 188.
66 See FAAA, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201 - 219a. The federal government has,
however, used financial incentives over highway funding to establish
what amounts to a national minimum drinking age. See 23 U.S.C. § 158
(2006).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
68 Mark Thornton, Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure, CATO INSTITUTE
POLICY ANALYSIS No. 157, 1 (July 17, 1991).
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given its lofty social and public health goals. Indeed, the
"noble experiment" as it came to be known, "was
undertaken to reduce crime and corruption, solve social
problems, reduce the tax burden created by prisons and
poorhouses, and improve health and hygiene in America."69
These goals are similarly idealized by the CSA,70 which has
been espoused as no less than the protector of the nation's
health and public welfare.7 1
Ignoring the pitfalls of Prohibition and the social ills
befalling blind adherence to rigid moral high ground not
only ignores potential economic boons due to product
taxation and retail sale, but also leaves "controlled"
substances to be bartered for in the underground market,
adulterated by drug dealers, and subject only to regulation
72through the criminal underworld. To be sure, despite the
noble ideals pushed by Prohibitionists in an effort to rid
society of the social ills created by alcohol, the homicide
69 Id.
70 CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (2006) ("The illegal importation,
manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper use of
controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the
health and general welfare of the American people.").
71 David E. Joranson & Aaron Gilson, Controlled Substances, Medical
Practice, and the Law, in PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER FIRE: THE
INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT, THE MEDIA, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS ON
SOMATIC THERAPIES 173-187 (Harold I. Schwartz ed., 1994) ("Today's
war on drugs is distinguished by intense media coverage of drug-
related crime, new antidrug laws, and efforts to educate schoolchildren
and the public to 'just say no' to drugs. The message is clear: Drugs are
dangerous and must be avoided.").
72 The theory known as the "Iron Law of Prohibition" posits that as
drug and alcohol enforcement increases so does the potency,
variability, and adulteration of the substances. See Richard Cowan,
How the Narcs Created Crack, NATIONAL REVIEW, Dec. 5, 1986, at
30-31. Further, the drugs will not be produced or consumed under
normal market constraints, potentially destroying any possible benefits
attributed to the decrease in consumption ascribed to the law in the first
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rate increased by seventy-eight percent during Prohibition,
all other crimes increased by twenty-four percent, and
arrests for drunkenness and disorderly conduct increased by
forty-one percent.73 In essence, "[m]ore crimes were
committed because [P]rohibition destroy[ed] legal jobs,
create[ed] black-market violence, divert[ed] resources from
enforcement of other laws, and greatly increase[d] the
prices people ha[d] to pay for the prohibited goods."74 The
analogy to marijuana is striking considering the enormous
rate of violent crime attributed to drug trafficking, yet the
exorbitant number of inmates in United States prisons are
incarcerated as a result of simple drug possession.75
2. A State-Based Solution to Federal Marijuana
Prohibition
In response to the historically apt analogy to
Prohibition and the arguable shortcomings inherent in the
current federal drug regime, some commentators argue for
adoption of the "Constitutional Alternative."76 Finding
support in basic public choice theory, supporters of the
"Constitutional Alternative" argue for a basic reversion of
authority to the states, wherein "the power to control the
manufacture, distribution, and consumption of all
psychoactives" would be under state control. Strongly
resembling the current federal-state dynamic over alcohol
distribution, this dynamic, however, would leave the
regulation of interstate drug distribution to the federal
government. 79 Rather than purporting to legalize marijuana
distribution, this power-shift is "intended to provide states
n Thornton, supra note 68, at 6.
74 Id.
7 See Ahdieh, infra note 187 and accompanying text.
76 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 186-249.
77 Id. at 194.
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
7 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 194.
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with greater autonomy by 'permitting the states to choose
drug-control strategies more in line with the preferences
and circumstances of their citizens."' 80
This state-based framework is supported by two
overarching policy rationales: 1) citizen choice; and 2)
policy innovation. 1 Decentralization would promote more
autonomy among the United States population to choose
the laws and regulations that fit their lifestyle preferences
so that if a "resident of one state does not like the rules
imposed by the majority there, he is free to move to a state
whose laws better suit his preferences or circumstances." 82
For example, if a nation consisted of one hundred people,
forty of whom want marijuana to be legalized and sixty
who would opt to retain the status quo, the ban on
marijuana possession will remain in place-as it is in the
CSA-leaving forty citizens unhappy with the law. 83f,
however, the nation were divided into separate states, each
with the power to enforce its own laws, then more citizens
would be content with the nation's regulatory policy. 84 For
instance, if one state contains fifty residents who favor the
status quo and ten residents who would opt for legalization,
while another state contains ten residents favoring
continued illegality, and thirty who would opt for
legalization, then one state will opt to maintain marijuana's
illegal status, while the other will opt for some form of
legalization. Simple arithmetic provides that eighty of the
nation's citizenry will be satisfied, while twenty are still
80 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 854 (quoting BENJAMIN & MILLER, Supra
note 22, at 196).
81 BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 192-93.
82 Id. at 193.
83 This example is analogized from O'Hear, supra note 7, at 857
(adapted from Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the
Court's "Unsteady Path": A theory of Judicial Enforcement of
Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447, 1467-68 (1995)).
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unhappy with the policy. 86 Adding in the option for citizen
mobility and minimal transactions costs, the net benefits
could be even greater. 87
Decentralization also promotes policy innovation
where states with divergent political considerations
experiment with new-and possibly more optimal-
regulatory policy. In stark contrast, a purely unitary
federal policy only gives the political process one shot to
respond to social needs.89 As Justice Brandeis' famous
dissent points out, "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." 90 The simplistic example above shows us how the
policy innovation rationale easily fits into the public choice
model wherein two states adopting different policies can
adapt, amend, or reject their own policies in response to the
consequences-both positive and negative-displayed by
their peer state's policy choices.91
Policymakers should take heed; just as Prohibition
failed to cure, and even exacerbated, the social ills it
attempted to curtail, the federal reign over marijuana law
could do the same; it has already created an enormous
taxpayer burden while leading to increased violent crime
and addiction. 92 Though federal legislators may lose the
political soapbox federal regulation so conveniently
provides, repeal of the CSA (as it relates to marijuana) will
lead to the same benefits we saw following enactment of
86 See id.
8 See id.
8 See BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22, at 193.
89 See id. at 193.
9 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). -
9 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 858.
92 Thornton, supra note 68, at 8-9.
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the Twenty-First Amendment:9 3 reduced corruption and
organized crime, job creation, and invigorated addiction
support programs.
III. Spillover Effects and Negative Externalities:
Evaluating the Criticisms of Consolidated State Control
Commentators have not unanimously rejoiced at the
prospect of bolstering state power in drug policymaking.
Rejecting the "Constitutional Alternative" approach to
United States drug policy, Michael O'Hear argues that the
federal government must "adopt a clear, coherent policy
towards state innovation"95 through the adoption of a
theory of government control he labels the "Competitive
Alternative." 96 O'Hear critiques the purely state-based
policymaking approach, arguing that it may actually
"reduce the degree of decentralization in national drug
policy by consolidating state control, and . . . [producing]
perverse incentives that warrant federal intervention."97
The first section to this Part outlines O'Hear's concerns
with an outright reversion of federal power to state
regulatory authority. The following section attempts to
rebut O'Hear's most salient critiques by utilizing traditional
theory in the field of jurisdictional competition. The next
section follows with an analysis of the focal points of
O'Hear's "Competitive Alternative," evaluating the federal
media machine and asset forfeiture laws. Finally, this Part
attempts to reconcile and incorporate some of O'Hear's
most salient and practical points with this article's approach
to state control over marijuana regulatory policy.
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Thornton, supra note 68, at 1
("The evidence affirms sound economic theory, which predicts that
prohibition of mutually beneficial exchanges is doomed to failure.").
4 Thornton, supra note 68, at 8-9.
95 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 853.
96 Id. at 873.
97 Id. at 859.
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A. O'Hear's Critique
Perhaps counter-intuitively, O'Hear argues that
carte blanche state control could lead to less local
autonomy than under the "Cooperative Federalist"
regime. This is so because much of the support for federal
drug control goes directly to localities-e.g. monetary
grants, referral for federal prosecution, and equitable
sharing statutes that allow local enforcement to keep some
of the proceeds of drug confiscations. 99 Local autonomy
may be engendered due to federal prosecutorial incentives
as well, where United States Attorneys are subject to
political pressures and must address local needs. 00 At the
very least, O'Hear argues that state regulatory control
would not clearly do a better job of regulatory
policymaking than the current regime by stating that,
"[n]otwithstanding the benefits of decentralization, federal
control may still be justified on the basis of 'Race to the
Bottom' pressures or spillover effects."' 0' He argues that
dominant state regulatory authority may create a "Race to
the Bottom" market failure wherein states will create
continually relaxed marijuana regulation laws in an effort
to garner tax revenues from legalized sale and
distribution.102
The critique further predicts that "spillover effects"
may undermine the workability of such a decentralization
framework because states that relax their drug policy may
create problematic negative externalities in "neighboring
get-tough states." 03 O'Hear points out that a significant
" Id. at 862.
99 Id.
10 See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 790
(1999).
101 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 866.
102 See id. at 866-67.
103 See id. at 867.
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part of the cost of marijuana lies in the risk and subterfuge
involved in the illegal trafficking regime, which inflates the
price.104 Consequently, when states legalize the process,
prices will deflate, attracting potential users in neighboring
states-states that maintain the illegality of marijuana use,
possession, and distribution.'0 5
In response to the alleged failings of state regulatory
dominance, O'Hear argues for implementation of his own
"Competitive Alternative." Though still grounded in a
presumption of decentralized policymaking, O'Hear
additionally focuses on reducing federal distortion of drug
policy information, increasing local political control over
federal drug enforcement decisions, and increasing local
law enforcement accountability.106
B. Countering the Critique
Despite O'Hear's reasoned criticisms, state-based
regulatory authority is in many ways hard to dispute.
Moreover, hypothetical fears can be assuaged, and state-
based authority validated, by analogy to the current alcohol
regulation framework, which would take nothing more than
repeal of the CSA as it relates to marijuana control. Further,
the main argument for federalization -07and one
104Id.
1os Id.
106 See id. at 873-74.
107 Another argument for federal regulation in a given area is
economies of scale in regulatory policy. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids
of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1211 (1977). While the DEA certainly centralizes the economies of
interstate enforcement and drug trafficking, more than ninety-five
percent of enforcement is done at the state and local level as it stands
now. As such, the economies of scale argument is largely inapplicable
in the Cooperative Federalism framework. Not to mention, the
argument posited in this article would maintain federal enforcement of
67
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recognized by O'Hearl 0 8-often lies in an attempt to curtail
negative externalities and potential "races to the bottom"
among states.109 It is unclear, however, that federal
regulation would be the answer, even if these market
failures existed. More relevant to this discussion is the
uncertainty that state-based marijuana policy is likely to
lead to the problems highlighted in O'Hear's critique.
1. Federal Regulation May Not be the Answer to a
Race to the Bottom for Marijuana Laws
As previously discussed, O'Hear points out the
likelihood of a "Race to the Bottom," and potential
spillover effects resulting from the decentralization of drug
policy.' 10 A common solution to these state-based market
failures is preemptive federal regulatory authority."
Picking up, however, on Richard Revesz's work in the
environmental market for laws, federal regulation is not
alwa s the quick fix to market failure that it is presumed to
be." The typical argument for federal authority is simple;
where federal regulation preempts state policymaking in
interstate trafficking and international crime, maintaining the existing
economies of scale where they are utilized most effectively.
108 See supra Part III. A.; O'Hear, supra note 7, at 866-67.
109 The "Race to the Bottom" has even been utilized to justify
overarching federal regulation on mobile capital. See Alfred C. Aman,
Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory
Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 1101, 1194 (1988). Preeminent legal scholars have even cited the
"Race to the Bottom" as the impetus behind The New Deal. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV.
421, 505 (1987).
110 See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 866
"' See, e.g., id.
112 Outside the environmental realm, and quite applicable to the market
for criminal laws, many commentators have simply noted that the
federal government is a poor conduit for creating and maintaining
efficient penal laws. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and
Competitive Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1733 (2006).
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the field, states will no longer be able to engage in an
inefficient policy battle with negative social utility." 3
Revesz used federal authority in environmental policy to
rebut the preemption rationale:
[Flederal environmental standards can have
adverse effects on other state programs.
Such secondary effects must be considered
in evaluating the desirability of federal
environmental regulation. Most importantly,
the presence of such effects suggests that
federal regulation will not be able to
eliminate the negative effects of interstate
competition. Recall that the central tenet of
race-to-the-bottom claims is that
competition will lead to the reduction of
social welfare; the assertion that states enact
suboptimally lax environmental standards is
simply a consequence of this more basic
problem. In the face of federal
environmental regulation, however, states
will continue to compete for industry by
adjusting the incentive structure of other
state programs. Federal regulation thus will
not solve the prisoner's dilemma.114
113 See Revesz, supra note 35, at 1211-12. But see Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996).
It is also interesting to point out another claim about the necessity of
federal law based on public choice theory: "state political process[es]
systematically undervalue the benefits of environmental protection or
overvalue the corresponding costs, whereas at the federal level the
calculus is more accurate." See Revesz, supra note 35 at 1212. Revesz
rebuts this claim by pointing out that rather than a failure in the market
for industrial locational decisions, this rational is really about failures in
the political process and proper information. Id. at 1223-24.
114 Revesz, supra note 35, at 1246.
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Revesz simply points out that regulation and social welfare
are not created in a vacuum. The government should, and
does, regulate in a complex matrix of policies involving a
number of different variables that all impact each other. To
take one of the variables that suffers from market failure
and impose a uniform federal standard upon it does not
necessarily lead to increased social welfare on the whole. In
essence, desirable regulation is too complex to achieve
through piecemeal centralization; it is akin to plugging the
dam with a federal forefinger while watching the wall
fissure just out of reach. Unfortunately for federalism and
state autonomy, the theoretical result from such an
approach is complete centralization in the federal
government.115
So what is to be made of the environmental-
marijuana analogy? Revesz points to competing regulatory
variables in the environmental arena, like workers' rights
and corporate taxation, which are inevitably tied to industry
location decisions.116 Thus, when several variables play
into corporate decision-making, one state-based regulatory
change is unlikely to provide the incentives necessary to
propagate a "Race to the Bottom."
A possible counterargument to the application of
this analogy here may elucidate a number of distinctions in
marijuana regulation. For example, political decisions in
the environmental arena are often aimed at maintaining the
status quo-keeping industry in place or simply combating
more stringent environmental policies-while progressive
marijuana regulation runs against the status quo. Thus,
rather than Revesz's world of environmental regulations
"' Id. at 1247 ("The prisoner's dilemma will not be solved through
federal environmental regulation alone, as the race-to-the-bottom
argument posits. States will simply respond by competing over another
variable. Thus, the only logical answer is to eliminate the possibility of
any competition altogether. In essence, then, the race-to-the-bottom
argument is an argument against federalism.").
"6 Id. at 1245-47.
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playing a small factor in business incentives, marijuana
regulation may play out differently. To be sure, political
inertia is undoubtedly an important consideration when
confronting change. Here, however, it is less than certain
that the pivotal "status quo" distinction makes a difference
in the theoretical argument; or practically speaking,
whether it creates a barrier at all. Rather, it seems that the
anti-drug status quo is less of a political fallback and more
of a public perception and interest group driver that would
be balanced in a jurisdictional competition framework. In
fact, it is more likely that the complexities of regulatory
dynamics would be more robust in the market for
marijuana than contemplated in Revesz's critique of federal
oversight in the environmental arena.
Comparing the market for marijuana laws to the
environmental law patchwork, there are several apparent
variables in a complex regulatory scheme that would play
against a centralization argument. Simply speaking, one
such variable lies in economic growth itself. Much like
pollution, if a state is not allowed to provide for legal
marijuana sales-and hence benefit from economic growth
and taxes-the state may loosen standards in other areas to
compensate. Further, drug tourism is not an unheard of
phenomenon; it is seen internationally, as well as in states
that allow for purchase without local citizenship." 7
Federalized drug prohibition could thus lead to overly lax
enforcement in tourism related to other vice goods like
gambling or prostitution. Furthermore, it is plausible that,
given the extensive prison overpopulation and the
overwhelming burden faced by enforcement authorities,
policymakers will institute overly lenient penalties for non-
117 See Yaniv Belhassen, Carla Almeida Santos & Natan Uriely,
Cannabis Use in Tourism: A Sociological Perspective, 26 LEISURE
STUDIES 303-19 (2007); See also Avelardo Valdez & Stephen J.
Sifaneck, Drug Tourists and Drug Policy on the U.S. -Mexican Border:
An Ethnographic Investigation of the Acquisition of Prescription
Drugs, 27 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 879-97 (1997).
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drug crimes or prosecutors may simply not enforce crimes
to the extent of the law. In sum, just as Revesz argues that
federal oversight is an unwise option for corrective
regulation in the environmental arena, preemptive
regulation in marijuana regulation is similarly disjunctive.
Even if a "Race to the Bottom" does exist for marijuana
laws, federal oversight may lead to inefficient regulation in
other economic areas, especially tourism, in addition to
penal laws and their enforcement.
2. It is Not Clear that Jurisdictional Competition for
Marijuana Laws Will Lead to a Race to the Bottom Among
States
The preceding discussion may be largely irrelevant,
however, if marijuana policy is not conducive to "Race to
the Bottom" or negative externality market failures. In fact,
there are several reasons we would not expect to see these
economic failures play out in the realm of marijuana policy.
In the criminal justice arena, scholars focus
extensively on the effects of penalties on crime
displacement and jurisdictional infighting that may lead to
inefficient collective-action problems. This market failure
contemplates peer jurisdictions "spending increasingly high
resources on their criminal justice system[s] simply to
deflect crime to their neighbors."" 8 Indeed, "in recent
decades [states] have shown increasing awareness of the
criminal justice policies of their sister states."1 9 Scholars
utilizing this approach are apt to recognize the need for
federal oversight to eliminate the state "race" to overly
harsh criminal penalties.'20 As previously discussed, a
similar argument has been heavily cited and remarked upon
118 Teichman, supra note 25, at 1835; see also Logan, supra note 112,
at 1733 (arguing against a federal approach to criminal policymaking).
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in the environmental field; noting the argument for federal
regulation to circumvent a state-industrial "Race to the
Bottom" over pollution standards. 12 1 The clearly
established "Race to the Bottom" argument in other areas
can certainly be applied to criminal justice standards,
wherein criminals are assumed to be rational actors and
will commit crimes in the jurisdictions where the costs
associated with illegal activity are the lowest.122 When one
state implements stricter criminal laws or penalties, it is
posited that criminals will at least consider relocating to a
jurisdiction with more lenient standards. 12 3 In the face of
criminal displacement, recipient states that presumably do
not want the social ills associated with more criminals
among its populace will respond in-kind and institute even
harsher penalties in an effort to displace the criminal
population within its borders.1 This established model,
however, only reasonably applies to criminal activities with
little to no societal benefits; for instance, violent crimes,
sex crimes, and larceny.
In contrast, regardless of the negative effects of
drug-use itself, a large proportion of the negative societal
consequences of criminal drug activity are due to the nature
of illicitness itself. To be sure, while drug use may lead to
community costs in the form of increased health care
outlays, rehabilitation, and reduced economic productivity,
121 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative
and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental
Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV.
713, 747 (1977); Stewart, supra note 107, at 1212 ("Given the mobility
of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may
rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards
that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic
development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be
more than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower
standards."). But see Revesz, supra note 35.
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the overwhelming demand for drugs creates an enormous
underground market,125 policed by drug dealers, street
gangs, organized crime syndicates, and drug cartels.
Whereas government-sanctioned markets are transparent
and regulated, underground "shadow economies"1 26 lead to
regulation by the hand of distribution, the criminal
underworld and organized crime syndicates. The end result
is a drug trade that leads to overwhelming violence, not just
in manufacturing countries, but also in developed countries,
which fuel the demand for these illicit substances. 127
On one hand, federal regulation of drug markets has
led to remarkable societal consequences in the form of
crime and violence. On the other hand, criminal justice
theorists suggest a potential "Race to the Bottom," leading
to overly harsh criminal penalties. It is not clear, however,
that a "Race to the Bottom" will occur in the marijuana
market. Empirics and logic suggest a successful and
societally beneficial market for drug legalization.128 For
125 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2010,
U.N. Sales No. E.10.XI.13 (2010), available at http://www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2010.html (estimating the
world drug economy to be near $400 billion, ranking alongside oil and
arms as the world's largest traded goods).
126 See Friedrich Schneider & Dominik Enste, Hiding in the Shadows:
The Growth of the Underground Economy, 30 ECON. ISSUES 1 (2002).
127 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has estimated that roughly five
percent of United States murders are drug-related. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ-149286, FACT SHEET: DRUG-RELATED CRIME (Sept.
1994) available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/DRRC.PDF. Even
more astoundingly, the violence fueled by Mexican drug cartels has
been estimated to account for ninety percent of killings in Mexico.
Traci Carl, Progress in Mexico Drug War is Drenched in Blood,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Mar. 10, 2009, 6:28 PM), http://msnbc.msn.com/
id/29620369/ns/world-news-americas/t/progress-mexico-drug-war-
blood-drenched/#.TpW6kHKyDaO.
128As an example, Colorado alone generated 2.2 million dollars in tax
revenue from marijuana sales directly, and another 2.2 million dollars
from increased sales tax revenues. John Ingold, Medical-Marijuana
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example, in contrast to state exile of pedophiles and violent
criminals, states stand to benefit from increased tax
revenues,129 less violent crime,130 and significant economic
growth by taking an already existing market
aboveground.131 In order for the "Race to the Bottom"
theory to attach, there must be negative externalities
sufficiently realized to incentivize states to change their
laws in an attempt to remedy those externalities.
First, consider Teichman's theory of overly strict
regulation to effectively exile criminals from within a
jurisdiction. This is hardly a far-fetched theory. Rather,
state and local policies regarding ex-convicts have shown
just such an effort to exile criminals through bussing and
relocation efforts. 132 Taking the next step, altering penal
laws to move criminals to other jurisdictions is also
plausible. However, this theory's application in the realm
of marijuana laws is less than certain and seemingly far-
Sales Tax Nets $2.2 Million for Colorado This Year, DENVERPOsT.COM
(Nov. 23, 2010, 6:36 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/news
/marijuana/ci_16688199. Colorado Springs, a city with under 500,000
residents, received $380,000 in sales tax attributed to marijuana
dispensaries. Id.
129 See Ingold, supra note 128; Projected Marijuana Tax Revenues,
CNN MONEY (last visited Nov. 1, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/
pf/features/lists/taxes-marijuana/table.html (citing JEFFREY MIRON,
BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF MARUUANA PROHIBITIONS (June 2005),
available at http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/mironreport.html).
130 See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 127.
131 An independent financial analysis firm projected medical marijuana
sales to reach 1.7 billion dollars in 2011. The State of the Medical
Marijuana Markets 2011: First Ever Investor-Grade Analysis Report of
the Marijuana Marketplace in the United States, FRESHNEWS.COM,
(Mar. 24, 2011, 7:20 AM), http://freshnews.com/news/470983/-the-
state-medical-marijuana-markets-20 11-first-ever-investor-grade-
analysis-report-mar. The report projects that medical marijuana sales
will reach 8.9 billion dollars-nearly half the estimated illegal market
for marijuana, if 20 more states allow its sale for medical use. Id.
132 See Roger Roots, When the Past is a Prison: The Hardening Plight
of the American Ex-Convict, 3 JUSTICE POL. J. 1 (2004).
75
32
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 76
fetched. The negative externalities associated with criminal
activities seemingly stem mostly from violence and
economic losses through theft. Though addiction, medical
problems, homelessness and vagrancy undoubtedly
contribute to the attacks against legalization, these factors
exist whether marijuana is legal or illegal, as we have seen
for decades. But if a jurisdiction legalizes marijuana, the
violent crime variable will presumably be eliminated as the
market moves out of the hands of organized crime and into
retail outlets.' 33
The more relevant question is whether marijuana
use will increase with legalization; and if it does, whether
the negative impacts of citizen use will outweigh the
benefits, such that the jurisdiction will seek to move users
outside its boundaries. Even assuming that most of the
populace will begin to use, or even abuse, marijuana, it
does not necessarily follow that there will be far-reaching
negative public impacts. Though it is certainly possible that
worker productivity may decrease, while accidents, DUIs,
and addiction rehabilitation needs increase.
It is also necessary to consider moral stigma and
negative externalities associated with inter-jurisdictional
trafficking. 134 Policymakers must balance these negative
implications with the possible benefits of taxation, reduced
prison populations, increased citizen autonomy and
happiness, and reduced violent crime through elimination
of the drug underworld. In contrast to the unsavory criminal
activities noted by Teichman, where the criminal element
moves from one jurisdiction to another, unwanted by all,
marijuana users and would-be distributors would bring both
benefits and possible detriments to a jurisdiction, leaving
133 See Schneider & Enste, supra note 126, at 1.
134 Assume that State A legalizes marijuana and State B maintains the
status quo of illegal use, possession, and distribution. While citizens of
State B could move to State A to reap the benefits of legal marijuana
use, many will choose not to if the costs of transporting marijuana back
to their home State remain low enough.
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state and local government to make the decisions
jurisdictional competition theorists argue should be made
by decentralized government in order to further efficient
and innovative lawmaking.
Even if Teichman's "Race to the Bottom" for
overregulation does not apply to the market for marijuana
laws, an argument could be made that the opposite may be
true-under-regulation incited by jurisdictions competing
for tax revenues, drug tourism, and economic growth. But
just as liquor laws faced the Teetotalers in the early 20th
century, progressive drug policy faces a strong check
through opposition in the religious right and parent
advocacy groups, among many others. The marijuana
policy battlefield offers a multitude of variables for
policymakers to balance as they attempt to appease and
attract a presumably mobile populace. As they have been in
the federal regulatory framework, interest groups will be at
the forefront of marijuana policymaking instituted by the
states, with constituencies influenced by a variety of
considerations including corporate, retail, and direct
taxation; citizen autonomy and happiness; economic
growth; and reduced crime and prison populations.135
135 "No more than 25 percent of Americans arrested for drugs are
involved in "trafficking," and almost all of those are petty, small-time
dealers. The remaining 75 percent of the arrests are for simple
possession, often for marijuana." BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 22,
at 3. It should be noted that traditionally tough-on-crime states-also
generally conservative-like "hang-em-high Texas," have led the way
in drug sentencing reform in an effort to reduce the size of their prison
populations. See Right and Proper: With a Record of Being Tough on
Crime, The Political Right Can Afford to Start Being Clever About It,
THE ECONOMIST, (May 26, 2011), http://www.economist.
com/node/18744617 (noting that the experimentation with alternative
forms of punishment for drug crimes has emanated from the fact that
"[m]ore people have been jailed for more crimes-particularly non-
violent drug-related crimes-and kept there longer"). Texas, for
instance, has instituted mandatory probation for first-time, low level
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Driving anti-marijuana legislation are various interest
groups intent on entrenching the status quo. For example,
the biggest contributors to Partnership for a Drug-Free
America are the Prison Industrial Complex, Big
Pharmaceutical, Big Tobacco, and the alcohol
manufacturing industry.' 36 If under-regulation is the
concerning factor in a "Race to the Bottom" analysis, these
major interest groups will play a strong role in combating
increasingly lenient marijuana policy. Considering a "Race
to the Bottom" may end in overly restrictive or overly
lenient lawmaking depending on the interests, the
aforementioned competing interests should be robust
enough to avoid a "race" in either direction. Given the
extent of politically salient variables in play, state
autonomy in policymaking would seem particularly apt in
the context of marijuana policy. Indeed, principles of
federalism suggest that states be able to choose the laws
most applicable to the characteristics of the jurisdiction
"thereby giving mobile citizens many different regulatory
regimes from which to choose when selecting a place to
live."l 37
Stepping outside the realm of theory, reality has
similarly not played out the way an under-regulating "Race
to the Bottom" would dictate. Only sixteen states138 have
made progressive marijuana regulation in the face of the
offenders, and devoted more than $200 million to drug treatment
programs in lieu of traditional prison sentences. Id.
136 The main contributors to Partnership for a Drug-Free America
included Proctor and Gamble, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Johnson &
Johnson, Merck, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and Anheuser-Busch.
Partnership for a Drug Free America, Sources of Funding 1988-1991,
SCHAFFER LIBRARY OF DRUG POLICY, (Dec. 31, 1991),
http://www.druglibrary.org/schafferlibrary/pdfal.htm.
137 Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481, 481
(2004).
138 See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Medical
Marijuana, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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current administration's tolerant Executive Order' 39 and
general federal reliance on state enforcement.140 Though
this article's proposed solution would remove the supposed
federal barrier, possibly giving hesitant states the last push
necessary to enter the "race" to legalization, a map of
current drug laws indicates that the impetus for progressive
marijuana laws is likely more strongly tied to geographical
ideologies and preferences than fear of the federal
government's stance on drug laws.14 1 For instance, the most
progressive laws tend to be on the West Coast: California,
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Alaska, Montana,
and Colorado.14 2 In contrast, southern "bible belt" states
have the strictest stance on marijuana with essentially zero-
tolerance laws in Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and
Tennessee. 143 While hardly conclusive evidence of
ideological preference influencing marijuana policymaking,
the religious, tobacco, and prison industrial interest groups'
stranglehold over the Southeast may well keep states in this
region from entertaining progressive legalization laws,
even if the federal government leaves the picture. This is
not surprising given that analogous alcohol bans in counties
and municipalities lie almost exclusively in the
Southeast.'"
139 See Meyer & Glover, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Will no
Longer be Prosecuted, U.S. Attorney General Say, supra note 28.
140 See Mikos, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
141 Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Marijuana Law
Reform in the United States: April 2010, NORML.ORG, (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011), http://stash.norml.org/wp-content/uploads/medipot-
states-2010-04.jpg.
142 Id.
143 The sole outlier in this southeastern geographic area is Mississippi,
which has decriminalized marijuana use and possession. Id.
144 Gary Schulte et al., Consideration of Driver Home County
Prohibition and Alcohol-Related Vehicle Crashes, 35 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 641-48 (2003).
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Despite the uncertainty inherent in jurisdictional
competition for marijuana laws, state autonomy seems to
be the best alternative in an effort to achieve the greatest
public welfare. In the absence of over-burdensome negative
externalities and a race to overly strict or overly lax
marijuana laws, the federal government's role should be
limited to international traffic cop and interstate referee.
Even if the aforementioned market failures do exist
in a competitive framework for marijuana regulation, it is
wholly unclear that the federal government's role as
uniform legislator is the proper solution where states have
other regulatory avenues to exploit in an effort to establish
economic growth and constituent appeasement. Even
Teichman concedes that "the U[nited] S[tates] government
has a dismal track record when it comes to criminal justice,
very often manifesting an irrational 'tou h on crime'
attitude irrespective of legislative context."1 4 Prohibition's
catastrophic failure should give policymakers keen
background insight into marijuana's current federal
regulatory future, opening the door for state and local
authority with the repeal of the CSA's prohibition on
marijuana use, possession, and distribution.
C. The Competitive Alternative's Practical
Concerns
Though the market for marijuana policy likely
includes the competing interests necessary to avoid the
problems encountered in state-based market failures,
O'Hear nonetheless makes several salient suggestions for
creating an efficient model for decentralization of
marijuana policy and enforcement, regardless of the federal
government's ultimate policymaking role.
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The "Competitive Alternative" first highlights
federal policies and practices that distort the political
debate over drug policy, hampering state and local efforts
that conflict with the federal "War on Drugs." 46 Federal
control inhibits state-based policy on a number of fronts.
For instance, the federal marketing machine places an
overwhelmingly negative spin on marijuana and
progressive drug enforcement policy.14 7 This federal
message stifles alternatives to the current status quo,
including decriminalization or medical marijuana
programs.148 In response, the "Competitive Alternative"
posits that federal funds for advertising and marketing
might be decentralized and turned over to the states to use
at their discretion, or at the very least, with minimal federal
funding conditions attached.14 9
In addition to revamping the federal media machine,
O'Hear articulates a need for local oversight over federal
enforcement.o50 This point harkens to the limited federal
resources for drug policy implementation, yet
acknowledges the overarching need for occasional federal
enforcement and prosecution. O'Hear proposes a possible
reform, requiring a local official, such as a District
Attorney, to approve federal prosecutions within municipal
boundaries so as to establish "systematic checks on federal
enforcement discretion."'1
5
While O'Hear maintains some federal control, he
does not discount the need for local policymaking and
enforcement. The "Competitive Alternative" keenly looks
to the incentives driving municipal actors who forge drug
146 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 875.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 Id. at 875-76.
'so Id. at 876.
1 Id. at 877. Though the example does include a federal "safety valve"
for cases involving interstate commerce or those that are accompanied
by unnecessary risks of substantial jurisdictional spillover concerns. Id.
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policy at the ground level, and points to the need for
increased accountability of local law enforcement
authorities.152 O'Hear cites the current dilemma over
equitable sharing laws and the ability for local law
enforcement to take property seized during drug
transactions. 153 This scheme perversely incentivizes local
law enforcement to over-enforce drug laws, while ignoring
community preferences. 154 In response, the "Competitive
Alternative" regime focuses on forfeiture law reform,
redirecting the assets seized rather than simply eliminating
equitable sharing laws.' 5 5 Instead of pocketing forfeiture
proceeds into local coffers, funds would be redirected to a
state general fund, in which the state would have an
incentive to redirect most of the funds back to the localities
in an effort to reward enforcement, while maintaining a
check on abuse of police authority.156
Theories abound as to the best policy mechanism
for drug policy; ranging most clearly from the recognizable
regulatory framework invoked by today's federal paradigm,
to the sovereign-based proposal espoused herein. What
today's federally supreme drug law regime lacks, however,
is the ability to adapt to, or account for, state innovation in
drug policy. In response, this article calls for a public-
choice mechanism of basic decentralization, empowering
states at the expense of federal oversight. This type of
argument has its potential critics, namely in Michael




156 Id.; see also David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson,
Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
679 (2003) (positing a similar argument). Note also that some states do
already have these state general funds in place to direct equitable
sharing forfeitures, but with federal involvement, local authorities can
turn to the federal government who plays hand in hand with local
forfeiture, possibly evading the checking measure sought by the fund
redirection in the first instance.
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O'Hear and the "Competitive Alternative" model.
Highlighting the danger of spillover effects or a potential
"Race to the Bottom," the "Competitive Alternative" calls
for continued federal supremacy, with local control in the
political and enforcement regimes, while systematically
overhauling the federal media machine. In the end, there
may be no perfect regulatory scheme, but if the past several
decades of drug regulation have shown us anything, the
United States fosters a vastly inefficient and over-budgeted
federal drug regime imposed at the expense of state
innovation. Recent state reforms have shown expansive
state-based marijuana law reform and the federal
government should respond in turn, ceding regulatory
authority to the states and local governments.
D. The Give and Take - Putting the Competitive
Alternative to Work
"[W]ithin our system of government, state control
stands not as an endpoint on the decentralization spectrum,
but as a midpoint between federal and local control."' 57
Indeed, O'Hear argues that the same tenets justifying
decentralization to the states support further reversion to
local governments.' 58 For example, citizen mobility is
greater at the local level than across state lines and, rather
than fifty state-level policy innovators, localities would
provide tens of thousands of opportunities for
experimentation.1 59 O'Hear's "Competitive Alternative"
makes local authorities the gatekeepers to federal
enforcement authority.160 Further, disassembling the federal
media machine and eliminating the misaligned forfeiture
157 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 860.
158 Id. (citing Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61
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laws are central propositions of the "Competitive
Alternative."'61 While the previous section made the case
for the "Constitutional Alternative," supporting a strong
decentralization framework, this section analyzes the
applicability of O'Hear's "Competitive Alternative" in an
attempt to improve the state-based framework and respond
to some of the likely shortcomings inherent in over-
expansive decentralization.
1. Questioning the Localist Paradigm
The "Competitive Alternative" pushes strongly for
extensive decentralization, past the state level and on to
local authorities, while maintaining a co-extensive federal
regime.162 Local governments, however, lack the financial
resources of states and have insufficient economies of scale
to justify expensive enforcement mechanisms.163 In
addition, while it is easier for criminals to cross
municipality lines, local enforcement jurisdiction only
extends to local boundaries.164 Most importantly, local
governments rely on the state to provide an overarching
criminal code and prison system. In O'Hear's defense, he
does acknowledge these problems, and notes a possible
solution of state funding, while allowing for local
implementation at municipalities' discretion. 166 O'Hear
argues that municipal decentralization accounts for local
implementation instead of the state in the same way it does
for state authority vis-A-vis the federal government;
essentially the argument is that if some decentralization is
good, then more is better.167 The consequences, however,
161 Id.
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of policymaking authority may not affect local
governments in the same way they do state governments.
Indeed, citizen autonomy is undoubtedly benefited by even
more localized policymaking, increasing the policy choices
of United States citizens from fifty states to tens of
thousands of counties or municipalities. But the ultimate
answer may lie in the incentives already encountered by the
entrenchment and proliferation of the federal "War on
Drugs" in the first place; policymakers seek to gain
political clout with their constituencies while paying for as
little of the program as possible.168 Just as federal
legislators do not want to foot the bill for drug enforcement
without the political windfall that comes with it, state
legislators do not want to provide the implementation funds
for policies that they may not agree with.
Given that the states currently enforce the majority
of marijuana violations, implement and fund the penal
institutions, and would be the main beneficiaries of state
corporate, sales, and direct drug taxes, the lawmaking
authority and implementation should remain with the states,
rather than localities that do not have the means to
implement their own policy choices. This is not to say that
states could not relinquish exclusive control, leaving
authority with the local government, just that they would
not be forced to do so, as O'Hear seems to argue. Just as
the Twenty-First Amendment places plenary control in the
hands of the states, repeal of the CSA's marijuana
restrictions would leave authority and implementation
solely to state discretion. While some states may pass
policymaking authority down to localities, such an outcome
would not be required, allowing state legislators to make
the decision as to where state funds and the resulting
political consequences go.
It is also unclear why O'Hear posits the need for
local authorities to serve as gatekeepers to federal
168 See supra Part I. A.
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enforcement authority' 69 as opposed to a purely state-based
mechanism, removing the need for federal enforcement in
intrastate marijuana policy. While the local-federal
cooperative would put more power in the hands of local
authorities, the "Competitive Alternative" uses a
roundabout mechanism for empowering local politicians,
while still supporting federal entrenchment. Indeed, rather
than bolstering extensive bureaucracy and the resulting
squabble between state and federal officials-not to
mention the looming threat of federal bullying of local
District Attorneys-an alternative would be for states and
local governments to maintain concurrent enforcement
authority, keepinf the federal government out of intrastate
marijuana issues.
In sum, O'Hear's localized enforcement regimes
seem less responsive to the shortcomings of state-based
regulatory authority, and more to amending some pitfalls in
the federally dominated regulatory model. For instance,
O'Hear argues for localization on one hand in making local
law enforcement accountable to the local community, yet
his framework notes that "local police would become
answerable not only to federal law enforcement authorities,
but also to local leaders who stand outside the law
enforcement establishment."l 7 1 Rather than decentralization
and the workability of a state-local dichotomy in
incentivizing efficient enforcement allocation, the
"Competitive Alternative" seemingly adapts the current
federal framework by instituting a more localized federal
regime, appeasing decentralization advocates while
tiptoeing around the status quo.
169 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 860.
170 This is not to say, however, that the federal government would not
maintain an enforcement agency, like the DEA, to oversee interstate
and international trafficking, or to enforce at the behest of the states as
the need arises.
171 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 880.
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2. Learning From the Competitive Alternative
The "Competitive Alternative" does, however,
make a good point about the perverse incentives generated
by current forfeiture laws and articulates a very workable
idea in the form of redirection to a state general fund. 17 2
Because municipal actors respond to drug policies at the
ground level, forfeiture and sharing laws incentivize local
enforcement personnel to over-enforce drug laws in an
effort to boost local coffers with the proceeds from drug
busts. Rather than redirecting all enforcement to the state,
O'Hear smartly recognizes the ability to redirect assets to
the state level.173
The "Competitive Alternative" also cogently points
to the problems inherent in the federal framing of the drug
issue to the American public.174 The federal propaganda
machine and its "War on Drugs" distorts the issues
surrounding marijuana legislation and pits reform groups
against politicians responding to the federal anti-drug
stance. O'Hear sensibly argues for federal advertising
funding to be directed instead to state marketing budgets or
to Congressional spending bills.s75 The importance of this
directive, however, may be limited under a "Constitutional
Alternative" framework, as the federal government plays
such a limited role in marijuana enforcement that continued
federal advertising spending would be unlikely. Unlike the
alcohol regulatory context, however, there are still many
other drugs that would fall under the guise of the CSA,
maintaining the federal government's incentive to continue
its campaign against illegal drugs. Thus, it does appear that
some control over the federal media machine is necessary,
and directing at least a portion of its funds as it relates to
172 See supra Part III. C.
173 O'Hear, supra note 7, at 870.
174 See id. at 875.
171 See id. at 875-76.
87
44
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 88
marijuana is imperative. In addition, stipulations as to the
federal content and the overarching "War on Drugs"
message would be essential to fostering state innovation
and adoption of progressive marijuana policies.
Ultimately, O'Hear's "Competitive Alternative"
argument, while putting forth strong ideas for specific
reforms, is seemingly unresponsive to any purported
shortcomings of state-based regulatory authority. Instead of
elucidating the decentralization regime he purports to stand
behind, O'Hear makes adjustments to much of the federally
entrenched framework we see in place today, without
accounting for the reality, and necessity of, state innovation
and competition in the market for marijuana. Nonetheless,
O'Hear makes cogent points about the federal role in
enforcement, incentives, and media content. Accordingly,
this article recognizes the need to adopt reformed forfeiture
laws, asset redirection, and redistributed government media
funding so as to properly set the stage for state-based
jurisdiction over marijuana laws.
IV. A Final Concern Raised by Decentralization:
The "Race to Nowhere"
The previous Part set out to raise, and refute, some
of the most salient concerns surrounding state consolidation
of marijuana policy. Among the most prominent arguments
against divergent state-based policymaking is the "Race to
the Bottom" effect garnered by individualized competition
for (or against) an identifiable social policy repercussion.
As discussed previously, the variety of interests inherent in
the market for marijuana do not lend it to a race to overly
stringent or lenient regulation and increasingly inefficient
outcomes inherent in one-upping neighboring states.
Interestingly though, is the possibility not for a "Race to the
Bottom," but simply to one extreme or the other, giving a
jurisdiction an all-or-nothing choice, legalization or a
complete ban. This Part will first explain a previously
88
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undeveloped theory of market failure and inefficiency in
state policymaking. The following section will outline the
assumptions necessary for this market failure to come to
fruition, ultimately concluding that the marijuana
marketplace is not conducive to establishing a "Race to
Nowhere."
A. The "Race to Nowhere"
This hypothetical "Race to Nowhere" can best be
envisioned through a basic example. Take, for instance, a
state (State A) that chooses to maintain the status quo,
keeping marijuana use, possession, and distribution illegal;
presumably incentivizing users and illegal distributers to
leave the jurisdiction. In contrast, another state (State B)
legalizes and taxes marijuana, garnering the benefit of
reduced crime and increased tax revenues. Both states will
get what they want from their policy choices. But there still
may be a middle jurisdiction; lest we forget, there are more
than two options for marijuana regulation. For instance, a
third state (State C) may simply decriminalize marijuana
(make possession and use legal, but not distribution or
trafficking) or institute misdemeanor possession laws,
attracting users who no longer face criminal penalties. But
in a regulatory framework where State A disincentivizes
users and State B eliminates the market for criminal
distribution, the organized criminal aspect of marijuana
distribution will be faced with one option to stay in
business-State C. All the marijuana users will be in State
B or State C and the market for illegal distribution will be
curbed in State B by legalized retail outlets.
Given this dilemma, a centrist state will reap few
benefits of decriminalization, while attracting much of the
unwanted criminal activity displaced by the other states. In
this situation, centrist states may enter their own race, but
not to the bottom or the top; rather to full legalization or
89
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illegalization in an effort to avoid the criminal element
entrenched in illegal drug distribution.
B. Undercutting the Assumptions Necessary to
Effectuate a "Race to Nowhere"
Clearly, the aforementioned result is not optimal for
a state that, all else being equal, chooses decriminalization,
medical marijuana, or drug treatment programs over full
legalization or a complete ban. Policymakers faced with an
all or nothing choice will opt for the lesser of two evils,
whatever that choice might be, but inefficient regardless.
This hypothetical, however, rests on several assumptions,
none of which can be fully realized in a world of bundled
laws and complex regulatory frameworks. For the "Race to
Nowhere" to occur there must be citizen mobility, full
information, and unrealized benefits from the centrist
choice.
First, consider the ability and willingness of citizens
to move from one jurisdiction to another based on the
marijuana policies within the state. With more than
fourteen million marijuana users in the United States, this is
hardly a trifling variable.176 But of those fourteen million
users, it is entirely unclear how many would choose to
move based on the legality of their marijuana use when all
they have ever known is a complete ban. Moreover, it is
questionable how many would choose to relocate at the
expense of families, jobs, and geographic ties. Assuming
that many users choose to remain in a total-ban jurisdiction,
State A, criminal distributors would have a market in both
State A and State C, the intermediate, decriminalized,
jurisdiction. Given this counterargument to full mobility,
we can expect a viable criminal distribution market spread
across both abolitionist and intermediate jurisdictions. One
176 Overview of Drug Use in the United States, INFOPLEASE.COM, (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011) http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0880105.html.
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part of the hypothetical should remain true, however, in
that the criminal element would remain displaced in State
B, where distribution is legal, because the criminal
distribution chain would be overwhelmed by regulated
retail sales.
Unlike mobility, full information is more likely to
come to fruition in this hypothetical. With the
overwhelming use of the Internet and the salience of the
marijuana policy debate, both consumers and distributors
are likely fully aware of the relevant policies in place. On
the demand side, any consumer making a decision to move
jurisdictions based on the marijuana policy is undoubtedly
informed of the law when making such a decision. Even if
not making a mobility decision based on another
jurisdiction's marijuana laws, it seems likely that a drug
user, accustomed to illicit substance use and avoiding
enforcement, will be aware of current policy and upcoming
changes to policy. On the supply side, just as we would
expect a businessman to know the regulations and laws that
apply to the business, drug dealers or legal dispensaries will
know the law, how to avoid or comply with it, and surely
be abreast of changes in policy. The true uncertainty in full
information is more likely to be through the lens of the
policymaker. A legislator faced with battling interest
groups may be more informed on highly specific issues and
less apprised of the indirect criminal costs associated with
marijuana distribution and displacement from other
jurisdictions.
The costs and benefits of proposed intermediate
policy is probably most difficult to project and account for
in a hypothetical "Race to Nowhere." For such a race to
occur, the hypothetical assumes that the benefits associated
with a centrist marijuana policy choice would be
outweighed by criminal activity within its borders based on
the policy actions of State A and State B. However, given
uncertain citizen mobility and possible criminal
disbursement between State C and State B, the costs
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associated with such a choice may be limited. Further, state
policymakers may not have full information on the
consequences of their decisions relative to increased
criminal distributor influx into the jurisdiction. Moreover,
even if these two factors are fully realized, legislators may
find that the benefits of an intermediate policy outweigh the
costs of any criminal influx. For instance, reduced
enforcement costs on minor possession may be
redistributed to enforcement on distributors and trafficking
or simply used for drug treatment. The intermediate policy
itself may be focused on public health, instituting drug
courts, or rehabilitation,'77 rather than turning a blind eye to
addiction as many abolitionist states do, or simply
promoting use as a legalization state does.
The "Race to Nowhere" is likely not a foregone
conclusion, albeit relying on several assumptions that are
almost impossible to predict. Focusing on the analogy to
alcohol regulation leads to the conclusion that the race is at
least plausible, though limited. While states are free to
implement their own alcohol policies, none has kept
alcohol completely illegal; some states, however,
maintained prohibition for several years following
enactment of the Twenty-First Amendment. But some
states do allow counties and municipalities to enact their
own alcohol restrictions, and many have done so, opting for
complete bans within county lines; restricted alcohol sales
on certain days of the week; or requiring distribution
through government suppliers. 7 9 While some of these
limitations are less than a complete ban, and clearly not full
legalization, neither are they akin to decriminalization
where one side of the economic chain, consumption, is
legalized and the other side, distribution, is criminal.
Centrist alcohol ordinances, such as Sunday sales and
177 See O'Hear, supra note 7, and accompanying text.
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government distribution, would not be expected to garner a
bootlegging criminal element. Criminals are unlikely to
move to take advantage of a one-day black market or to
attempt to circumvent government distribution when
consumers can easily accommodate the law and still
consume alcohol. Liquor law regulation in this context has
not progressed toward decriminalization or substance abuse
programs in lieu of criminal punishment. Rather, alcohol
policies reflect complete bans or legalization with retail
restrictions. The alcohol analogy, though not perfectly
aligned to marijuana regulation, seems to support a "Race
to Nowhere."
Even if a "Race to Nowhere" exists, the cure is not
federal regulation. The Prohibition and its aftermath tells us
that much. Beyond the alcohol regulatory analogy, the past
generations of over-enforcement; billions of dollars of
federal taxpayer money; seeming absence of a "Race to the
Bottom" or substantial negative externalities; exceedingly
high violent crime rates associated with illicit drugs; and
unclear federal enforcement policy lead to the conclusion
that decentralization is the best regulatory stance for
marijuana laws.
IV. Conclusion
Currently, more than 24.8 million people are
eligible to receive medical marijuana licenses under state
laws, and approximately 730,000 people actually do.180
Medical marijuana markets exist in seven states: California,
Colorado, Michigan, Montana, Oregon, Washington and
New Mexico and five more will open this year in Arizona,
Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island and the District of
180 Teresa Novellino, Will Pot Sell Better Than Sex?, PORTFOLIO.COM,
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Columbia.' Economically speaking, the marijuana
marketplace is projected to more than double within the
next five years.1 2 Outside of the capitalist retail market for
marijuana, the question remains whether there is a viable
market for innovative state laws. As addressed in Part II.A.-
B., the federal regime over marijuana laws is hampering
innovation and efficient policymaking, leaving overly harsh
federal laws that go largely unenforced in practice and by
Executive Order. State legislators and enforcement
authorities are left in the dark, and United States citizens
are faced with an unclear state-federal dichotomy by which
distribution may be illegal but consumption is
decriminalized. Even more striking, dispensary operators
may be legally licensed by the state and yet subject to
federal enforcement for violation of the Controlled
Substances Act.183 Even outside the lack of clarity and poor
suitability of federal authority, we should expect a fairly
robust "market" for marijuana laws where there are
competing interests, an informed and reactive populace,
and a primed state-to-state competition for economic
growth and citizenry.184 Further, as discussed in Part III.B,
there does not seem to be reason to expect marijuana
policies to be ill-suited for efficient competition, by
promoting a "Race to the Bottom" 85 through imperfect
181 Id. Note that of the sixteen states enacting progressive marijuana
laws, not all support medical marijuana licensing.
18 id.
183 MARIJUANA USA (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 8, 2010).
184 See generally Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a
Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REv.
ECON. POL'Y 212 (2005) (arguing against Mark Roe's characterization
of a vertical competitive dynamic prompted by federal oversight and
the threat of preemption).
185 See generally William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974) (arguing that
Delaware corporate law promotes a "Race to the Bottom" due to the
cozy relationship between the judiciary, legislature, and Delaware Bar,
leading to minimal shareholder protections and poor relations between
94
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information, negative externalities, or power inequalities
between suppliers and consumers of laws. 86 In addition,
federalization as a remedy to an unclear problem stifles
innovation and experimentation, replacing jurisdictional
competition with regulatory oversight and unwavering
rules.'87 Most simply, a given legal system would prefer
state laws if the "market" has the ability to produce
efficient laws and will not inflict market failures leading to
overly stringent or lax regulation.'8 In the market for
marijuana laws, one would expect to encounter less need
for consistency, uniformity, and correction of market
failure because jurisdictional "markets" in the drug trade
will presumably be transparent and consumers will have
relatively full information, while states will have
appropriate incentives to optimize laws.' 89
The legalization, decriminalization, and
medicalization of marijuana undoubtedly comprise a story
shareholders and corporate managers). But see Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEG. STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing against Cary's theory of a "Race to
the Bottom" to the extent that corporate managers respond not just to
law, but to market pressures-in particular product markets, corporate
control, and capital markets-and these pressures direct managers to
provide efficient shareholder protections to the extent they produce
profits through the securities exchanges).
186 ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 33-36
(2009).
187 Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance"
in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BuFF. L. REV.
721, 736-37 (2005) ("State corporate law permits state regulators to
pursue new legal technologies they deem likely to offer competitive
advantage. If they are right, such innovations can be expected to take
hold, both in the state of innovation and among its competitors. If
undesirable, they can promptly be discarded. Even if flawed rules
persist, they do minimum harm. Universally applicable federal rules, by
contrast, stifle experimentation and innovation-the hallmarks of an
efficient market.").
188 See generally id.
189 See Thorton, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
95
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in its early chapters. As states continue to adopt progressive
marijuana laws, the legal marijuana industry continues to
grow, and the executive branch ignores the strictures of the
CSA, the structure of marijuana policy will begin to
crystallize. Until then, United States citizens are at a
crossroads of conflicting state and federal law and are
waiting to see how the policymaking game will play out.
Interest groups and lobbyists are no strangers to this game,
pitting Big Tobacco, Big Pharma, the Prison Industrial
Complex, and the Religious Right against a progressive
populace and state legislators looking to fill their recession-
ragged coffers while cutting back on drug-induced
violence.
The federal regulatory regime and the politically
motivated and maintained "War on Drugs" costs American
taxpayers billions of dollars a year in a seemingly fruitless
attempt to rid the American populace of the social and
moral hazards of drug use. Yet the social ills of marijuana
use stem almost entirely from its illicitness, 90 inducing
violent organized crime but causing fewer deaths each year
than alcoholl91 or tobacco use;192 marijuana's addiction rate
'9 In fact, commentators on the international organized crime syndicate
have opined, "that as long as drugs that people want to consume are
prohibited, and therefore provided by criminals, driving the trade out of
one bloodstained area will only push it into some other godforsaken
place. But unless and until drugs are legalized, that is the best Central
America can hope to do." See The Drug War Hits Central America,
supra note 45.
191 See By the Numbers: Deaths Caused by Alcohol, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (December 1996). Alcohol causes more than 100,000
deaths a year. Id. While cannabis use is not documented according to
indirect death rates, there are no documented direct deaths due to
marijuana use. Id. Facts on Cannabis and Alcohol, SAFERCHOICE.
ORG, (last visited Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.saferchoice.org/
content/view/24/53/ (noting that marijuana is less detrimental than
tobacco in terms of long term use, aggressive behavior and violence,
domestic attacks, sexual assault, and reckless behavior); Visualizing the
Guardian Datablog: "Deadliest Drugs," INFORMATION IS
96
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is also a mere pittance compared to nicotine addiction.' 9 3
The United States system of federalism is premised on
extensive state autonomy, leading to experimentation and
innovation in policymaking, concurrent with the citizenry's
ability to choose the laws they want applied by locating in a
jurisdiction with the bundle of laws they find most
appealing. In accordance with this paradigm, we have
already seen the bulwark of progressive marijuana laws
enacted on the West Coast,194 and almost no innovation in
the Southeast, seemingly in line with population ideologies
in those respective locales.' 95
Cutting the federal government entirely out of
marijuana regulation and enforcement is neither plausible,
nor advisable. The drug trade is too international to limit
federal involvement and states rely on federal enforcement
where distribution and trafficking crosses state lines.
Economies of scale also empower the federal government
to utilize powerful resources in an effort to keep pace with
well-funded drug syndicates. Further, federal legislators
have too much at stake in the drug debate to let it go
BEAUTIFUL.NET, (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.informationisbeautiful.
net/2009/visualising-the-guardian-datablog/.
192 See U.N. W.H.O., Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2009:
Implementing Smoke-Free Environments, World Health Organization
(2009), available at whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/
9789241563918_eng-full.pdf (noting that tobacco is responsible for
aeproximately five million deaths a year worldwide).
3 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, U.S. ATT'Y
GEN., The Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction: A
Report of the Surgeon General, (1988), available at http://
profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/Z/D/; Bill Urell, Am I Stupid, Or is This
List of the 18 Most Addictive Drugs All Mixed Up?, ADDICTION
RECOVERY BASICS.COM, (last visited Nov. 2, 2011), http://
addictionrecoverybasics.com/am-i-stupid-or-is-this-list-of-the- 18-most-
addictive-drugs-all-mixed-up/ (noting that marijuana falls thirteenth on
the list of eighteen most addictive substances, while nicotine lies first).
194 See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, supra note 141
and accompanying text.
195 See id.; see also note 143 and accompanying text.
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entirely. As seen in the alcohol regulatory scheme, we can
expect to see Congress utilize its spending power to
incentivize states to act in accordance with federal
objectives.16 That being said, two central arguments from
the "Competitive Alternative" give informed guidance to
Congress, arguing to reign back on forfeiture laws and
simultaneously cut spending on federal media campaigns
against marijuana use.197
Ultimately, it seems the marijuana train has left the
station and has the momentum necessary to establish its
legitimacy in the United States. The million-dollar question
then is how it will be regulated. From the standpoint of
history and logic, state authority is the best vehicle for
public welfare, citizen autonomy, and efficient regulation.
98
196 See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
See supra Part III.D.2.
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